# Finding Optimal Bitsliced Implementations of $4 \times 4$-bit S-boxes ${ }^{\star}$ 

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#### Abstract

In this paper, we will present an approach to find efficient bitsliced implementations of invertible $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes. The approach generalises the methods introduced by Osvik [12]. We consider equivalence classes of s-boxes under linear and affine equivalence and search for the most efficient s-box in each class. The properties of these s-boxes are discussed and compared with s-boxes used in existing cryptographic primitives. Finally, we propose a methodology to design efficient cryptographic primitives by making use of our findings.


Keywords: Cryptography, s-boxes, efficiency, bitslicing, software implementation, equivalence class.

## 1 Introduction

The integration of security applications on embedded and mobile platforms requires lightweight and efficient cryptographic primitives. In this work, we focus on the efficient software implementation of $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes. S-boxes are an essential part of many cryptographic primitives. We investigate bitsliced implementations, which proved to be a very efficient implementation technique for AES $[5,7,6]$ and Serpent [12]. Bitslicing is an implementation technique where bitwise operations can be parallelised due to the fact that processors work with registers larger than one bit. On modern CPUs this can be up to a factor of 128 [11]. Intel's upcoming AVX extension will even allow 256 -bit operands.

[^0]In this paper, we show how to find the most efficient bitsliced implementations of s-boxes. In contrast to previous approaches, the aim of this work is to cover the whole range of $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes by classifying the s-boxes into equivalence classes and finding the most efficient s-box per class. The classification criterion we choose provides invariant properties with regard to linear and differential cryptanalysis. We discuss the s-box's application in the design of efficient ciphers.

In Sect. 2, a brief overview of previous work is presented. The classification method and the search for efficient implementations are presented in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we discuss the results obtained and compare them to s-boxes used in other cryptographic primitives. A new approach to design primitives is proposed in Sect. 5, and it is explained how designers can benefit from this work. In Sect. 6, we suggest further ideas to be investigated based on our findings. We conclude in Sect. 7 .

## 2 Previous Work

Osvik introduces algorithms to find efficient implementations of a given s-box in [12]. The approach requires that the s-box is given and does not search for s-boxes with optimal implementations costs. Osvik's approach uses a heuristic algorithm. While this reduces the search complexity, it does not guarantee that the optimal solution will be found. He applied these techniques to find efficient implementations of the Serpent s-boxes.

Watanabe used a search technique similar to Osvik's to generate an efficient s-box for the hash function Luffa [14]. In contrast to Osvik's approach, the s-boxes were not specified in advance. The aim of the search is to find an s-box with strong properties and a low implementation cost. In a first version, the s-boxes have been generated using predefined building blocks. A first version of building blocks guaranteed invertibility and the second version has been introduced to improve the performance. The second version of the Luffa s-box has been designed by combining random instructions. This method is expected to find good s-boxes, but it is not guaranteed that an s-box with the optimal trade-off between the implementation cost and the cryptographic properties will be found.

## 3 Our Approach

### 3.1 S-box Properties and Classification

Typically, block ciphers are constructed using non-linear s-boxes and linear layers. The decomposition into linear and non-linear building blocks


Fig. 1. Affine equivalence algorithm
is not unique. Linear operations can be moved between those building blocks. Any linear or affine transformation applied to the input or the output of an s-box could also be incorporated in the linear layer instead [9].

Definition 1. $S$-boxes are said to be affinely equivalent if the following relation holds:

$$
\begin{equation*}
S_{1}(x)=B \cdot\left(S_{2}(A \cdot x \oplus a) \oplus b\right), \forall x \in\{0,1\}^{n}, \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

with invertible linear mappings $(A, B)$ and constants $(a, b)$. The relation is illustrated in Fig. 1.

The most important property is that all members of an affine equivalence class share the same properties with respect to linear and differential cryptanalysis. For this reason, the affine equivalence has been used as a classification criterion in our search.

In order to characterise s-boxes, we make use of a set of important properties:

- Difference distribution table [2]
- Linear approximation table [8]
- Branch number
- Existence of fixed points
- Algebraic degree of the output bits

The difference distribution table indicates the probability that a given input difference results in a certain output difference. The probability that certain correlations hold between inputs and outputs is given by the linear approximation table. Worst-case probabilities are important to bound the complexity of cryptanalytic attacks. Respectively, these probabilities are referred to as the maximal differential probability (MDP) and maximal linear probability (MLP). The linear approximation table and difference
distribution table depend only on the s-box. Any affine transformation applied to the s-box can only swap elements in these tables, but not change their values.

Another property is the branch number. It is an important property describing the diffusion capabilities.

Definition 2. In this paper, the branch number is defined as

$$
\begin{equation*}
B=\min _{a, b \neq a}\left(w_{h}(a \oplus b)+w_{h}(S(a) \oplus S(b)),\right. \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $w_{h}$ is the Hamming weight and $S$ the s-box.
A different definition is used in [4] where the branch number is defined as a measure of how many s-boxes will be active in the next round. This second definition is more suitable for entire rounds of a cipher than for single s-boxes. The branch number according to Def. 2 depends on the position of the values in the difference distribution table. This implies that it can be influenced by affine transformations.

Fixed points depend on the affine transformations, due to affine constants which can create or avoid any fixed point.

The affine transformation has only limited influence on the polynomial representation of the output bits. It can merge or cancel out monomials by performing additions between the output bits or change the operands by performing additions at the input side. However, it can never create new monomials of higher degree than the maximum degree already present. It is also not possible to cancel out all maximum degree monomials by affine transformations. The maximal algebraic degree is thus invariant within each class.

### 3.2 Introduction into Search Algorithms

Before presenting our search approach, a brief introduction to search terminology and algorithms has to be given.

Definition 3. The branching factor is defined as the average number of childnodes of a node.

Depth first search (DFS) is an algorithm to search trees. It starts at the tree's root and visits as many nodes of one branch as possible before backtracking, see Fig. 2(a). The time complexity of DFS is exponential in the depth, $\mathcal{O}\left(b_{t}{ }^{d}\right)$ (with $b_{t}$ the tree's branching factor and $d$ the depth). The algorithm's memory requirement is linear in the depth, $\mathcal{O}(d)$. Only


Fig. 2. The depth first search (DFS) and the breadth first search (BFS)


Fig. 3. Iterative deepening depth first search (ID-DFS)
the nodes on the path to the current node have to be held in memory. In infinite trees the depth first search will not terminate.

The breadth first search (BFS) visits all nodes of a depth before advancing to higher level of depth. It finds the solution which is the closest to the root first. The main disadvantage of the search is the high memory requirement which is exponential in the depth, $\mathcal{O}\left(b_{t}{ }^{d}\right)$. The time complexity is $\mathcal{O}\left(b_{t}{ }^{d}\right)$ as for the DFS.

In the case of an unknown depth of the first solution the iterative deepening depth first search (ID-DFS) solves the previously discussed problem of the DFS. The algorithm repeatedly runs depth limited depth first searches while increasing the limit. The limit is incremented by the minimal possible increment such that at least one more node will be visited in the next run. The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 3. The IDDFS combines the property of monotonously increasing the depth, like in BFS, with the lower space complexity of the DFS. The fact that many nodes are visited multiple times does not influence the efficiency as much as it may seem. The higher the branching factor the more significant become the nodes that are further away from the root. The time and space complexity are the same as for the DFS.

### 3.3 Search

The general goal of this work is to find the most efficient implementations of s-boxes. In Sect. 3.1, we introduced a classification criterion so that we can group s-boxes with common properties with respect to linear and differential cryptanalysis. Combined, one can find the most efficient implementation that fulfil certain properties. In order to find the implementation, we introduce a search method.

The basic idea during the search is to go through all possible combinations of an instruction set. The architecture, for which the implementations are searched for, consists of 5 registers and an instruction containing the following instructions: $A N D, O R, X O R, N O T, M O V$ (copy). Four registers are needed to store the information of a $4 \times 4$-bit s-box and a fifth register is used for intermediate storage for the calculation of invertible s-boxes. Our choice of the instruction set consists of the basic operations of the commonly used architectures.

An important property of the search is that the number of instructions is monotonously increasing. The first node found that represents a new class is therefore also an optimal implementation of that class with respect to the number of instructions.

Another property of the search is its deterministic behaviour. Determinism guarantees that each run of the software will find exactly the same set of representatives with the following definition:

Definition 4. The representative is the s-box of an affine equivalence class with the least implementation cost (number of instructions) and among those of equal cost, the order of the instructions determines which is chosen.

These properties can be achieved by an iterative deepening depth first search (ID-DFS).

Using the previously defined architecture results in a branching factor of 85 , which is the number of instruction and operand combinations. Reaching high depths with such a branching factor is not feasible. Therefore, we implemented a set of rules that remove redundant nodes from the search tree. First, we used the non-heuristic rules from Osvik [12]. They consist of the following rules:

- Recursion stops when the register contents can no longer generate a permutation.
- When two instruction sequences are identied as being equivalent, we remove one of them from the search.


Fig. 4. Affine equivalence used for caching

- No instruction other than MOV may make a register contain a copy of the value in another register.
- Unread registers may not be written to by the MOV instruction.
- Negated registers (those last modied by a NOT instruction) are marked as such, and may not again be negated until they have been read.

Second, we also removed nodes that are affinely equivalent with other states saved in a cache. We interpreted the five registers of a node as an unfinished $4 \times 5$-bit s-box. We consider the s-box as incomplete because not every node represents an invertible s-box. Some nodes are only intermediate steps before reaching a valid s-box. The affine mapping at the output side can thus not be applied. More instructions may follow. Only bit swapping is allowed at this stage because the order of bits is of no impact. The equivalence algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 4. S and R are affinely equivalent if there exists invertible linear mappings (A, B) and a constant (a) such that the two s-boxes become equal. The branching factor was reduced from 85 initially down to 10 when applying Osvik's rules. By using affine equivalences in the caching algorithm, the branching factor could be even decreased further to less than 7 .

### 3.4 Restrictions of the Search

We restricted the search by imposing the following properties:

- The size of the s-boxes has been set to $4 \times 4$-bit. $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes are the smallest commonly used s-boxes. The number of affine classes was also important for this decision. While $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes have 302 affine equivalence classes, $5 \times 5$-bit s-boxes have about $2^{61}$ classes [9]. The latter is impractical to enumerate.
- We decided to limit our scope to invertible s-boxes. In principle, the approach would work with non-invertible s-boxes as well. The main argument is the efficiency of the search. The search space for noninvertible s-boxes is larger and some of the used algorithms, e.g., the equivalence algorithm, are less efficient for non-invertible s-boxes.


## 4 Results

The search was designed such that it would eventually find implementations for all classes. Correct results are found earlier so that the search can be stopped at any time. The search ran for more than 2 months on a computer with 8 cores $^{3}$ and 64 Gb of RAM used for caching. At the moment the search was stopped, our program finished searching s-boxes with 12 instructions. The search for s-boxes with 13 instructions is incomplete. The search found the most efficient representatives of 272 out of 302 equivalence classes. A list of these representatives is presented in appendix A . These representatives represent about $90 \%$ of all $4 \times 4$-bit sboxes. There are two main reasons for stopping the search. First, the most efficient s-box for a class with optimal non-linear properties, $\mathrm{MDP}=1 / 4$ and $\operatorname{MLP}=1 / 2+1 / 4$, has been found. This s-box makes use of only 9 instructions. S-boxes with 13 instructions have $44 \%$ higher cost but their advantage against linear and differential cryptanalysis is limited. Second, the complexity of the search is exponential in the depth of the search. Much more resources are required to find the last equivalence classes.

### 4.1 Cost vs. Properties

As a first analysis, we look at the correlation between the implementation cost and the properties regarding linear and differential cryptanalysis. We focus on the worst case probability of linear approximations or differentials, i.e., MLP and MDP. Tables 1 and 2 show the minimum required number of instructions to obtain a certain MLP or MDP. It can be seen that 9 instructions is an important threshold. With fewer instructions, the s-box has linear approximations and differentials with non-optimal probabilities. For fewer than 9 instructions there always exist correlations of 1 between certain input and output bits. Using more instructions, on the other hand, one can not improve the worst case probability, but reduce the number of differentials or linear approximations that have the worst case probability.

[^1]

Fig. 5. Representative of class 13
Table 1. Minimum number of instructions required to implement an s-box with a given MLP. MLP $-1 / 2$ is the probability bias and $|c|$ is the correlation.

$$
\begin{array}{c|cccc}
\text { MLP }-1 / 2 & 1 / 8 & 1 / 4 & 3 / 8 & 1 / 2 \\
|c| & 1 / 4 & 1 / 2 & 3 / 4 & 1 \\
\hline \text { min. cost } & - & 9 & 9 & 0
\end{array}
$$

In [9], 16 affine equivalence classes are presented that have optimal non-linear properties. The optimal properties are MDP $=1 / 4$ and MLP $=1 / 2+1 / 4$. Class 13 (see appendix A) has the least implementation cost among the optimal classes. The representative of class 13 is shown in Fig. 5.

Another interesting property is the branch number. All representatives that have been found have the same branch number. In fact, the branch numbers are of the smallest possible value of 2 . The representatives can be considered as the essence of an s-box that achieves certain non-linear properties. However, all found representatives are weak with regard to linear mixing properties. This can be compensated for by the linear/affine layer of a cipher. It can be shown that there exist invertible linear mappings that translate any arbitrary differential at the input and the output to differentials with weight 1 . Thus, every linear equivalence class and consequently also every affine equivalence class contains s-boxes with branch number 2.

Table 2. Minimum number of instructions required to implement an s-box with a given MDP

$$
\begin{array}{c|ccccccccc}
\text { MDP } & 1 / 8 & 1 / 4 & 3 / 8 & 1 / 2 & 5 / 8 & 3 / 4 & 7 / 8 & 1 \\
\hline \min . \operatorname{cost} & - & 9 & 10 & 6 & 9 & 6 & - & 0
\end{array}
$$

Table 3. The $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes used in some symmetric primitives

| Primitive | S-box | Class |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Serpent [1] | $S_{4}, S_{5}$ | 9 |
|  | $S_{4}^{-1}, S_{5}^{-1}$ | 10 |
|  | $S_{0}^{-1}, S_{1}$ | 14 |
|  | $S_{0}, S_{1}^{-1}$ | 15 |
|  | $S_{2}, S_{2}^{-1}, S_{6}, S_{6}^{-1} 16$ |  |
|  | $S_{3}, S_{3}^{-1}, S_{7}, S_{7}^{-1}$ | not found |
| Luffa [14] | $Q$ | 16 |
| Noekeon [3] $S=S^{-1}$ | 13 |  |

### 4.2 Affine Equivalence and the NOT Instruction

We observed that none of the found representatives make use of the NOT instruction. This implies that the optimal implementations of all of them have zero as fixed point. The search finds one representative per class. It can not be excluded that an equivalence class does contain another s-box with the same number of instruction but without or with a different fixed point. For class 13, it is interesting to notice that the optimal implementation without fixed point found by Watanabe [14] needs 10 instructions instead of 9 . The s-boxes were not equal, but affinely equivalent to each other. One has to notice that the optimisation processes that are compared have different target platforms.

Conjecture 1. We conjecture that there exist optimal implementations for all 302 equivalence classes that do not make use of the NOT instruction.

For s-boxes that are designed with 5 registers and a structure that resembles an unbalanced Feistel network [13], we have found many examples showing that any NOT instruction can be moved using De Morgan's laws to either of the ends of the s-box. We call an s-box 'Feistel resembling' if the outcome of a non-linear operation of maximum 4 registers is added to another register. The affine equivalence makes NOT instructions at the ends irrelevant because the affine constants can compensate them. For the s-boxes that are not of this type no simple explanation has been found. We leave a formal proof to further research.

### 4.3 Comparison with Known Primitives

Furthermore, we have classified the s-boxes of Serpent, Luffa and Noekeon [1, $3,10]$. Even though they are in classes for which we have found most ef-
ficient implementations, none of them is equal to a representative. The reason for this is assumed to be the design strategy and the properties that are variant within a class, like the involution in the case of Noekeon. We will explain the reason for this in more detail in Sect. 5.

Interesting in this table is that Noekeon uses an s-box from class 13. Noekeon is a cipher designed for efficient bitsliced implementation, and class 13 is the class for which we found the fastest bitsliced implementation. However, from knowing the cost of a representative one can not conclude about the cost of any other s-box within the class. Second, Noekeon requires that its s-box is an involution. This is only possible in some of the classes for which the inverse s-box is member of the same class, e.g., classes 11 and 13.

## 5 A New Design Approach

In the previous section, we compared the s-boxes used in existing primitives with the representatives found in this work. It turned out that none of the primitives used one of the representatives. Furthermore, it is not possible to replace the s-boxes by one of the representatives because of the design goals set by the designers. These design goals involve properties that are variant within affine equivalence classes.

The design strategies for many primitives in use separate the design of the various components from the s-box design. During the process of designing the other parts, the specifications of the s-box are refined step by step. Some of these refinements restrict properties that are variant within a class. The table indicating the best implementations can only be used if the specifications for the s-box contain only properties that are invariant. Any of the variant properties is restricting the choice of which s-box of the class has to be used and may cause that the most efficient member, the representative, can not be chosen.

To benefit efficiently from the representatives, one has to follow a new approach when designing the primitives. In the first step, the s-box is chosen. For this purpose, the designer needs target platform specific tables of most efficient representatives. One of the representatives will be chosen depending on the non-linear properties that are desired. It is important to choose the constraints with care. Some of the s-boxes have the same histogram of the linear approximation table and the differential distribution table but different implementation costs. After the s-box has been chosen the linear layer is designed in such a way that all the design goals of the cipher are fulfilled.

It is expected that this methodology leads to a cipher with low implementation cost. We concentrate on the search of s-box implementations and leave the application of our results for cipher design for future research.

## 6 Future Work

Verifying the new design approach. In Sect. 5, we introduced a new design methodology for cryptographic primitives. The problem of the interaction between the linear and the substitution layer has not been fully investigated. We suggest to investigate if using the most efficient s-boxes can lead to highly efficient primitives and that possible shortcomings of the s-boxes regarding variant properties can be compensated by the linear layer in an efficient way.
Generalising the findings to design larger s-boxes. This work focused on the design of $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes. The application of the methods for larger s-boxes is assumed to be not feasible. Therefore, we suggest to analyse if it is possible to generalise the findings of $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes to larger s-boxes.
Proof for NOT instruction. We suggest to further investigate the fact that not a single one of the representatives found, makes use of the NOT instruction. We conjecture that this is the case for all representatives of the affine equivalence classes. A proof is left to future research.
Extended search. The search targets a basic architecture. Modern processors offer more advanced techniques, such as parallelism, pipelining and instruction set extensions. Using these features for s-box implementations can result in other tradeoffs which could be investigated.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented an approach to find efficient bitsliced implementations of invertible $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes. In a first step, we introduced a search to find the most efficient implementations of s-boxes.

We presented a list (see appendix A) of optimal implementations for a specified instruction set. This list contains the most efficient classes covering $90 \%$ of all $4 \times 4$-bit s-boxes.

The representatives have been analysed for their properties and were compared with s-boxes used in known primitives. Finally, we presented a new design methodology for cryptographic primitives.

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## A List of Representatives

Tables 4-10 list the representatives of the affine equivalence classes. The following properties are included: the linear histogram (c), the differential histogram (p), the implementation cost, the branch number (bn) of the representative, the maximum algebraic degree of the output bits (deg) and the equivalence class that contains the inverse of the s-box (inv).

Table 4. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes

| Representative $\|c\|=1 / 41 / 23 / 4$ |  |  |  | $1 p=1 / 81 / 43 / 81 / 25 / 83 / 47 / 8$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 cost bn deg inv |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 2 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 3 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 4 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 5 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| 6 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| $7 \quad ?$ | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | $?$ | 3 ? |
| 8 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 9 0cabf9d4e8635172 | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 84 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 310 |
| 10 01298bd7cfe654a3 | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 84 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 39 |
| 11 0a43562edfb1c789 | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 84 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 113 | 2 | 311 |
| 12 ? | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 84 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 13 086d5f7c4e2391ba | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 2 | 313 |
| $14086 c 7 e 5 f 4 d 21 \mathrm{~b} 39 \mathrm{a}$ | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 2 | 315 |
| $150845 d 7 f e c 6 a 391 \mathrm{~b} 2$ | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 2 | 314 |
| 16 01a2987cdef4563b | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 316 |
| 17 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 93 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 18 02839b7eca65df14 | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 87 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 320 |
| 19 04afb6372e81c95d | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 87 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 3 ? |
| 2002415 f3e8bc6a9d7 | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 87 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 218 |
| 21 0251c6afd7984e3b | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 87 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 113 | 2 | 321 |
| 22 ? | 112 | 32 | 0 | 1 | 87 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| 23 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 96 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| 24 ? | 120 | 30 | 0 | 1 | 96 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| 250 c 69735248 af 1 dbe | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 78 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 226 |
| 26 06a953b842c7df1e | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 78 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 225 |
| 27 0a2387bfc5de4961 | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 78 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 229 |
| 280 a 2387 bf 4 d 56 c 1 e 9 | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 78 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 228 |
| 29 0913a4bf2e6587dc | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 78 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 327 |
| $3006 a f 7 d 5 e 48 c 391 b 2$ | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 81 | 15 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 330 |
| 31 04598ceb6a72f3d1 | 96 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 80 | 18 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 331 |
| 32 08a319f4c6e5d7b2 | 64 | 44 | 0 | 1 | 64 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 2 | 333 |
| 33 086d5f7e4c2193ba | 64 | 44 | 0 | 1 | 64 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 2 | 232 |
| 34 ? | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 78 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| 35 ? | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 78 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | $3 ?$ |
| 36 ? | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 78 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | $3 ?$ |
| 37 03298bd5efc476a1 | 111 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 337 |
| 38 03d74f985ec621ab | 111 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 72 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 338 |
| 39 0e8952d7ca4b61f3 | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 81 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 113 | 2 | 339 |
| $400283 \mathrm{db} 4 \mathrm{eca769f15}$ | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 81 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 113 | 2 | 340 |
| 41 ? | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 81 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 ? | ? | 3 ? |
| 42 ? | 119 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 81 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $1 ?$ | ? | 3 ? |
| $430 \mathrm{c} 2784 \mathrm{fa5961e3db}$ | 111 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 75 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 244 |
| 44 0c4d9fba8e635172 | 111 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 75 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 343 |
| 4506 abc 84 e 79 f 2 d 153 | 111 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 75 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 2 | 345 |

Table 5. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)


Table 6. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)

| Representative $\|c\|$ |  | $=1 / 4$ | $1 / 2$ | $3 / 4$ | 1 | $p=1 / 8$ | $1 / 4$ | $3 / 8$ | $1 / 2$ | $5 / 8$ | $3 / 4$ | $7 / 8$ | 1 | cost | bn | deg inv |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 91 0329d7e8f4c51ba6 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 72 | 21 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 91 |
| 92 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 72 | 21 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $?$ | $?$ | 3 | $?$ |
| 93 0c2dbf16ae497358 | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 66 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 95 |
| 94 095f18e4a7b3d2c6 | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 66 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 94 |
| 95 04e8ca639bfd5172 | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 66 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3 | 93 |
| 96 0bd57f243a18e6c9 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 96 |
| 97 0913b24ca6ed587f | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 97 |
| 98 0425be968fdc731a | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 98 |
| 99 0724ae85bfdc6319 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
| 100 01b2c5e3f7d689a4 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 102 |
| 101 0ac5d736f4b912e8 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 101 |
| 102 09657cade4831bf2 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 100 |
| 103 0821e7ca6fd593b4 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 104 |
| 104 012bd4e3c7f598a6 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 103 |
| 105 | 118 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $?$ | $?$ | 3 |  |$?$

Table 7. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)

| Representative $\|c\|=1 / 41 / 23 / 4$ |  |  |  | $1 p=1 / 81 / 43 / 81 / 25 / 83 / 47 / 8$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 cost bn deg inv |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $13604 \mathrm{e} 935 \mathrm{fb} 71 \mathrm{d86ac} 2$ | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3137 |
| 137 0ac9f75d1b32e684 | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3136 |
| 138 0591e26d7afbc843 | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3138 |
| 139 08f43bd6912c7e5a | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 2139 |
| 1400821 f 396 ea 45 b 7 dc | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3141 |
| $1410 f 415 \mathrm{abb97d2e8c3}$ | 110 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 74 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3140 |
| 142 0283df7ace659b14 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3143 |
| 143 0a6d5f7c4e2391b8 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2142 |
| $14404 \mathrm{ac} 8 \mathrm{e} 239 \mathrm{fbd5176}$ | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3145 |
| 1450821 f6dac5e4b397 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3144 |
| 1460814 d ea7f62b3c9 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3147 |
| 147 0425b796aec1f3d8 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2146 |
| 14804617 b a8ce3d9f2 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2150 |
| 149 0c63d1fae82597b4 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2149 |
| 150 0e6bd9f2c8a51734 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3148 |
| $15104 \mathrm{af8d21be9c7356}$ | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3153 |
| 152 0c81bf53d9762ea4 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3152 |
| 1530 a 2395 b 8 d 7 f6c4e1 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3151 |
| 1540824 f6ae5d7391cb | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3154 |
| 15504639 fd2e8cb517a | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 64 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3155 |
| $1560 c 69 a 24 e f 758 b 31 d$ | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3156 |
| $15708296 c 5 a 4 f$ deb317 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3157 |
| 158 0bd57f26183ac4e9 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3158 |
| 159 08e5c7a4b391f6d2 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3160 |
| 160 08a9f65db217e3c4 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3159 |
| 1610 a b46d2ce7f1395 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3161 |
| 162 08235cfae64719bd | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3162 |
| 163 0ac46e251b39f7d8 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3166 |
| 164 08e4c6a591b3d7f2 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3165 |
| 1650 ce53b91d7f284a6 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | , | 11 | 2 | 3164 |
| 166 046abec9f8d27351 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3163 |
| 167 0823b79ad5f64ce1 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3169 |
| 168 0a4e86c13bd5f792 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3168 |
| $16906 e 842 c 397 f 5 b 1 d a$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3167 |
| 170 05bf8d349cae6217 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3170 |
| 171 0291e8a3f6d5b7c4 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 72 | 15 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3171 |
| 172 068cea2db7951f34 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3172 |
| $17308235 c f a e 74619 \mathrm{bd}$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3173 |
| 1740219 d 7 e 3 c 6 f 48 ab 5 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3174 |
| $17503 \mathrm{a} 1 \mathrm{c} 69 \mathrm{df748b25}$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3177 |
| $1760283 \mathrm{ca6edb} 749 \mathrm{f} 15$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3176 |
| 177032476 a cfe98bd1 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3175 |
| $1780289 f 75 a 6 c 4 d 3 b 1 e$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 69 | 15 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3178 |
| 1790 ea3c84671f2d95b | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 65 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3179 |
| 180072634 bc 58 f 9 e 1 ad | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 65 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3181 |

Table 8. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)

| Representative $\|c\|=1 / 41 / 23 / 4$ |  |  |  | $1 p=1 / 81 / 43 / 81 / 25 / 83 / 47 / 8$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 cost bn deg inv |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 18106 b 3 e 9 c 1 fa 4 d 2785 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 65 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3180 |
| 182 09324debf75618ac | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 68 | 21 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 13 | 2 | 3182 |
| 1830 e42a6c3fbd97158 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3184 |
| $184047 \mathrm{bafe9} 88 \mathrm{c} 36251$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3183 |
| $185041 \mathrm{dbea5267fc983}$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3185 |
| 1860481 eb7d62f3c95a | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3186 |
| 187 0ce53b91f7d4a286 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3187 |
| 188 0a3b29c5fe4d6781 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 62 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 2188 |
| 189 0ea342c6fb78d951 | 117 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 80 | 9 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3189 |
| 190 0285ca4e9f36db71 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 74 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3190 |
| 191 06c18a4edf329b75 | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 74 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3191 |
| 192 08e64c29d7f51b3a | 93 | 30 | 3 | 1 | 65 | 15 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3193 |
| 193 08e6c4a1d7f593b2 | 93 | 30 | 3 | 1 | 65 | 15 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3192 |
| 194 08a1e2c6f7d4b395 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 60 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3194 |
| 1950 e6c84a17fd5b392 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 60 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 13 | 2 | 3195 |
| 1960 d786e5c2a1fb349 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 60 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3196 |
| 197 0938e64bf75ca21d | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 63 | 18 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3197 |
| 198 08a1e6c3f7d4b295 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 66 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3198 |
| 199 08a1e6d3f7c5b294 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 66 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3199 |
| 200 0c6348aef71259bd | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 59 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3200 |
| $20108 e 64 c 2 b d 7 f 5193 a$ | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 56 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3201 |
| 202 08ce4623f5d791ba | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 56 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3203 |
| 203 024ce6a97f5d1b38 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 56 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3202 |
| 204 04a8ec23dbf95176 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 56 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3204 |
| 2050 ac 46 e 2 d 1 b 397 f 58 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3206 |
| 206 08a17b95f3d2c6e4 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3205 |
| 207 0759aec8fbd26341 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3208 |
| 208 08297d5a4cefb316 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3207 |
| 209 02a846c397b1f5de | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3209 |
| 210 06ac24e397b5d1f8 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3211 |
| 211 0ac62e83b795f1d4 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 62 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3210 |
| 212 0d98ea65fb7341c2 | 116 | 22 | 4 | 1 | 73 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3212 |
| 213 0283de7bcf659a14 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 67 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3214 |
| 214 0392ce7bdf648a15 | 108 | 24 | 4 | 1 | 67 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3213 |
| $2150281 \mathrm{df7ace459b36}$ | 92 | 28 | 4 | 1 | 48 | 30 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 9 | 2 | 3216 |
| $216086 f 5 d 7 e 4 c 29 b 31 a$ | 92 | 28 | 4 | 1 | 48 | 30 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 9 | 2 | 2215 |
| 217 0283de7bcf459a16 | 115 | 20 | 5 | 1 | 56 | 21 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3217 |
| $2180829 f 75 a e 64 d b 31 \mathrm{c}$ | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 52 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 9 | 2 | 3218 |
| 219 0823b79ad5f6c4e1 | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 52 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3219 |
| 220 08a2d5f3e7c691b4 | 115 | 20 | 5 | 1 | 64 | 15 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3220 |
| 221 08a2c4e597b1d3f6 | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 58 | 18 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3221 |
| 222 08e6c4a197f5d3b2 | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 58 | 18 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 11 | 2 | 3222 |
| 223 08a64ce75df1b293 | 114 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 63 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3223 |
| 2240462 e 8 c 3715 bf 9 da | 114 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 63 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 2 | 3224 |
| 22508465 dbce 7 a 291 f 3 | 114 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 54 | 21 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 12 | 2 | 3225 |

Table 9. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)

| Representative $\|c\|=1 / 41 / 23 / 4$ |  |  |  | $1 p=1 / 81 / 43 / 81 / 25 / 83 / 47 / 8$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 cost bn deg inv |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 226 08a1d5f3c4e6b297 | 114 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 54 | 21 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3226 |
| 227 0abd4ef9823657c1 | 106 | 20 | 6 | 1 | 54 | 18 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2227 |
| 228 048c62e315f97bda | 114 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 69 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 3228 |
| 229 0823d7fa4ce591b6 | 106 | 20 | 6 | 1 | 63 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | , | 11 | 2 | 3229 |
| $2300 c 69 a 24 e f 718 b 35 d$ | 113 | 16 | 7 | 1 | 62 | 9 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3230 |
| 2310938 e65bf74ca21d | 110 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 65 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3231 |
| 232 092e7456cdfb83a1 | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 66 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3232 |
| 233 03fc56ed47928a1b | 94 | 32 | 2 | 1 | 66 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2233 |
| $234097 e 4 d 6 f 5 c 38 a 21 b$ | 109 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 66 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 2234 |
| $23506 \mathrm{ac} 8 \mathrm{e} 239 \mathrm{fbd5174}$ | 92 | 28 | 4 | 1 | 60 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3235 |
| $23606 \mathrm{ac} 8 \mathrm{e} 219 \mathrm{fbd7354}$ | 92 | 28 | 4 | 1 | 60 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3236 |
| 237 08e64c29f7d51b3a | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 48 | 29 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3237 |
| 2380921 b 3 d 5 f 7 a 86 e 4 c | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 48 | 29 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3238 |
| 239 08e64c29d5f71b3a | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 54 | 23 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3239 |
| 240 0ac46e29f7d53b18 | 107 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 60 | 17 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3240 |
| $24108 a 719 b 35 d f 6 e 2 c 4$ | 105 | 18 | 7 | 1 | 58 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3241 |
| 242 0a23f7d86ec591b4 | 105 | 18 | 7 | 1 | 58 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3242 |
| 243 086d5f7ec4291b3a | 62 | 40 | 2 | 1 | 48 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2243 |
| $24408 \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{4c} 2 \mathrm{bf} 7 \mathrm{~d} 5193 \mathrm{a}$ | 90 | 24 | 6 | 1 | 42 | 27 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3244 |
| 245084 a e1d5c397f2b | 112 | 28 | 0 | 2 | 57 | 21 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 3245 |
| 246 08ab193246cf7d5e | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 51 | 21 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2246 |
| 247 0ba981234fe6dc57 | 112 | 28 | 0 | 2 | 50 | 30 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2247 |
| 2480 c 2 f 1 d 7 a 48693 b e | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 44 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2251 |
| 249 012b89f7cde654a3 | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 44 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3249 |
| 250 082b195d4f6e7c3a | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 44 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3250 |
| $251024513768 \mathrm{ecbf9da}$ | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 44 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2248 |
| 2520 c 7 b 3 e 6 a 2 f 4 d 5918 | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 44 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3252 |
| $253086 f 5 d 7 e 4 c 293 b 1 a$ | 64 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 32 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2256 |
| 254086 f 5 d 7 e 4 c 2391 ba | 64 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 32 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2255 |
| 255082 b 197 c 4 e 6 d 5 f 3 a | 64 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 32 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 3254 |
| $256046173528 c e b d 9 f a$ | 64 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 32 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 2253 |
| $257086 f 5 d 7 e c 4 a 1 b 392$ | 64 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 32 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 2257 |
| 258 08a319f6c4e7d5b2 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 2 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2258 |
| 25909 f 75 d 26183 ac 4 eb | 110 | 24 | 2 | 2 | 45 | 21 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3259 |
| 260 08a357dfb192c4e6 | 110 | 24 | 2 | 2 | 50 | 18 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3260 |
| 261 08a71df395b2c4e6 | 94 | 28 | 2 | 2 | 40 | 24 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3263 |
| 262 0459afebd8c16273 | 94 | 28 | 2 | 2 | 40 | 24 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3262 |
| 263 0812b3a95d46f7ce | 94 | 28 | 2 | 2 | 40 | 24 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2261 |
| 26404369 ca78def512b | 110 | 24 | 2 | 2 | 48 | 24 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3264 |
| $265032547618 \mathrm{bacfe9d}$ | 108 | 20 | 4 | 2 | 44 | 12 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2265 |
| 26608297 f5a6e4d3b1c | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 28 | 30 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 3267 |
| 267 082b193a4ce5f7d6 | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 28 | 30 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 2266 |
| 268 082b3f1a5d7e4c69 | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 28 | 30 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 3268 |
| 269 0461dbf28ce9537a | 56 | 28 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |  | 2 | 3269 |
| 270 092e1436cdfb85a7 | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 48 | 29 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3270 |

Table 10. Implementations of the affine equivalence classes (continued)

| Representative $\|c\|=1 / 41 / 23 / 4$ |  |  |  | $1 p=1 / 81 / 43 / 81 / 25 / 83 / 47 / 8$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 cost bn deg inv |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 271 082b1a6d5f7e4c39 | 96 | 32 | 0 | 2 | 48 | 29 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3271 |
| $272046 \mathrm{f953b1d7ec82a}$ | 110 | 24 | 2 | 2 | 36 | 35 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3272 |
| 273 0a28c6e53b91f7d4 | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 40 | 17 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3273 |
| 274 082a4ce51b39d7f6 | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 40 | 17 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3274 |
| 2750 a 28 c 4 e 53 b 91 f 7 d 6 | 106 | 16 | 6 | 2 | 32 | 23 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3275 |
| 276 082ac4e519b3d7f6 | 104 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 42 | 11 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3276 |
| 277 082b7c5a496e3f1d | 108 | 20 | 4 | 2 | 58 | 16 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3277 |
| $27808 \mathrm{a} 75 \mathrm{db} 391 \mathrm{f6c4e2}$ | 92 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 46 | 22 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3278 |
| 279 086e4c295d7f1b3a | 90 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 42 | 9 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3279 |
| 280 082a4ce7193bf5d6 | 104 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 24 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3280 |
| 281 082a4ce5193bd7f6 | 104 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 48 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3281 |
| 282 082ac4e319b7d5f6 | 100 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 3282 |
| 283 086e4c295d7f3b1a | 62 | 36 | 2 | 2 | 36 | 21 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 3283 |
| $28404 \mathrm{ae8c} 239 \mathrm{dbf} 5176$ | 62 | 36 | 2 | 2 | 36 | 21 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 3284 |
| 28508 a 35 df 2 c 4 e 791 b 6 | 60 | 32 | 4 | 2 | 32 | 27 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 3285 |
| $28608 \mathrm{e} 64 \mathrm{c} 2 \mathrm{bd5f7193a}$ | 90 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 24 | 27 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 3286 |
| $2870823 d 5 f a 4 c e 791$ b6 | 88 | 16 | 8 | 2 | 38 | 13 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 3287 |
| $288046153728 c e 9 d b f a$ | 0 | 56 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2288 |
| $289046 \mathrm{~b} 59728 \mathrm{ce3d1fa}$ | 0 | 56 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2289 |
| $2900463 d 9 f 28 c e b 517 a$ | 56 | 24 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 3290 |
| 2910127456389 aedcbf | 96 | 24 | 0 | 4 | 24 | 6 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 2291 |
| $292081 \mathrm{~b} 2 \mathrm{a} 394 \mathrm{c5e7f6d}$ | 64 | 32 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 2292 |
| 293 0c2f1d7b483a596e | 96 | 24 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 38 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3293 |
| 294 082ac4e719b3d5f6 | 88 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 20 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 3294 |
| $295086 e 4 c 2 b 5 d 7 f 193 a$ | 60 | 24 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 9 | 16 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 3295 |
| $296082 b 5 d 7 f 193 e 4 c 6 a$ | 84 | 0 | 12 | 4 | 36 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 3296 |
| $297082 b 197 e 4 c 6 f 5 d 3 a$ | 0 | 48 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2297 |
| $298046351728 c e b d 9 f a$ | 0 | 48 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2298 |
| 299 082b5d7a4c6f193e | 56 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3299 |
| 300 082a4c6f193b5d7e | 56 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3300 |
| 301 082b193a4c6f5d7e | 0 | 32 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2301 |
| 3020123456789 abcdef | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 1302 |


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[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ Intel Xeon CPU X7350@ 2.93 GHz

